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ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFICACY THROUGH  
PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 
Anita Bernstein*
INTRODUCTION 
Alarmists spent decades trumpeting the dire effects of 
personal injury litigation on the supply of useful prescription 
drugs.1 Their cries used to draw attention with vivid and 
specific worries. Imagine a world with no vaccines, they 
fretted.2 Now that pregnant women in the United States have 
lost their only drug for morning sickness, more losses are sure 
* Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory, and Wallace Stevens Professor of 
Law, New York Law School. I appreciate the suggestions and support of 
Margaret Berger, Benjamin Zipursky, and Tony Sebok, as well as the careful 
attention I received from participants in a Public Law Theory seminar at 
Washington University School of Law. 
1 Although this paper discusses “prescription drugs,” a category that 
Congress legislated in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, see infra 
note 87 and accompanying text, much of its thesis extends also to over-the-
counter drugs and medical devices. 
2 See, e.g., American Medical Association, Proceedings of the House of 
Delegates, 138th Annual Meeting 79 (1988) (deeming liability a serious threat 
to vaccine innovation and supply); Paula Jacobi, Pharmaceutical Tort 
Liability: A Justifiable Nemesis to Drug Innovation and Access?, 38 JOHN 
MARSHALL L. REV. 987, 987 (2005) (quoting headlines about the alarm). 
Because the United States is the center of drug research, “the world” might 
not be hyperbole. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription 
for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 141 (2005) 
(describing the vast American pharmaceutical industry with reference to the 
size and scope of FDA regulatory efforts). 
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to follow.3 Stifled innovation. Lost cures. Ill health.4
Legislators and judges responded to the alarm. Vaccines, the 
drug category whose supply was most dramatically threatened, 
gained protection through federal no-fault legislation in 1986.5 
Twelve years later, Congress banned state-level personal injury 
litigation for harms attributed to implanted biomaterials.6 
Several states enacted industry-friendly legislation insulating 
drug manufacturers from an array of claims.7 On the question of 
3 MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 336 (1996) (noting 
that now that no such drug is available, an increased fraction of pregnant 
women have been hospitalized for severe morning sickness); Peter W. Huber, 
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the 
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 n.196 (1985) (quoting from a New 
York Times editorial that lamented the downfall of this drug); Jacobi, supra 
note 2, at 991 (remarking that this withdrawal was “not an isolated failure”). 
4 For a sampling of these works, see William M. Brown, Deja Vu All 
Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 
40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1 (2001); Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, 
and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 
645 (2003); Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability 
May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent 
Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199 (1992); LOUIS LASAGNA, THE CHILLING 
EFFECT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, in THE 
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND 
INNOVATION 334, 334-48 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
5 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300aa-11 (2004). 
6 Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, § 
1, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2004)). 
7 One strong state law is Mich. Stat. Ann. § 600.2946 (5) (2006), which 
eliminates causes of action for defective warning or design when the product 
complained about is an FDA-approved drug. See Adam Cohen, They Say We 
Have Too Many Lawsuits? Tell It to Jack Cline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, 
Week in Rev., at 11 (declaring that the pharmaceutical lobby pushed this 
reform through the Michigan legislature). The statute survived a challenge 
based on state constitutional law. Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658 
N.W. 2d 127 (Mich. 2003). For examples of narrower legislation, see Cal. 
Health & Safety Code § 199.45(n)(3) (West Supp. 2003) (enacted 1986) 
(immunizing manufacturers, should any come to exist, from design and 
warning liability for HIV vaccines); Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 2, at 
176 n.262 (referring to state statutes providing that compliance with federal 
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whether its past approvals of warning language preempt personal 
injury actions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) came 
to invert its position, swiveling from support for liability as a 
source of safety to a stance that liability threatens supply,8 and 
began to file amicus briefs urging courts to dismiss these claims 
based on federal preemption.9 Some courts have agreed with its 
new posture.10
The initiative to shield prescription drugs from the ravages 
of liability developed as a corner of the tort reform battleground. 
When the plaintiffs’ side of the struggle worked against this 
initiative through the 1980s and into the early years of the new 
century, they gave drugs a subordinate place in their fight 
against measures to limit liability. Prescription drugs never were 
prominent villains to the plaintiffs’ bar. The trial lawyers who 
lobbied Congress to dampen federal tort reform and fought 
court-closing legislation in the statehouses attacked the insurance 
industry, environmental polluters, “corporate greed,” and other 
perennials, but did not identify pharmaceuticals as especially 
deserving of liability as a sanction. The prescription drug 
business caught another break circa 1987, when militants decried 
regulatory policy as harmful to the health of HIV-infected 
patients.11 These partisans of regulatory relief identified 
regulations establishes a rebuttable presumption that any product, including a 
drug, is not defective). 
8 Food and Drug Administration, Requirements on Content and Format 
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 3922, 2924 (2006). See also DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW 909-10 (2005) (describing this shift). 
9 See Amicus Brief of the United States, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 
659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084; Brief 
for Amicus Curiae the United States, Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 
2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-5500), 2006 WL 1784525. 
10 See Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:04-CV-1477(GLS GJD), 2006 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 49616 (N.D.N.Y. July 19 2006); Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc., 
432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
11 For a short history, see Matthew C. Lovell, Second Thoughts: Do the 
FDA’s Responses to a Fatal Drug Trial and the AIDS Activist Community’s 
Doubts About Early Access to Drugs Hint at a Shift in Basic FDA Policy?, 51 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 273, 277-78 (1996). 
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constraints on the prerogatives of industry as a problem rather 
than a solution. With their street-theater flair and dramatic 
diction—Silence=Death, Queer Nation, ACT UP (an acronym 
for AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)—AIDS activists could not 
be dismissed as tools of the drug-corporate establishment, and 
added a little radical chic to an increasingly conservative 
consensus. 
Over these decades, legal luck would occasionally falter for 
the industry. A portion of sales revenues returns to customers as 
compensation for their personal injuries. The diet drug phen-fen, 
for example, cost its manufacturer more than $16 billion in 
payments for cardiac injuries.12 Harms attributed to Zyprexa, a 
drug for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, generated $1.2 
billion in settlement expenses by early 2007.13 Big Pharma 
suffered a blow in 2004 when Vioxx, a one-time market leader, 
became discredited and then went on to generate several 
multimillion-dollar jury verdicts against its manufacturer, as well 
as, alarm within the industry.14 Drug companies also have paid 
fines and civil penalties.15 To date, however, large setbacks for 
pharmaceuticals defendants remain rare and (in relation to 
profits and gross sales revenues for the industry) trivial.16
12 Phen-fen’s Hazards Emerge Anew, Bus. Wire, Mar. 22, 2004, 
available at www.lexisnexis.com. 
13 Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles with 18,000 Over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2007, at C1. 
14 The Lessons of Merck’s Bad Day in Court, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 
200. available at www.lexisnexis.com. When Vioxx lost its FDA approval, 
every major newspaper in the United States led with the story. 
15 The most notorious example involves the epilepsy drug Neurontin. In 
2004 its manufacturer, Parke Davis, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and agreed to pay a $240 million 
criminal fine, the second-largest criminal fine in a health-law prosecution, in 
addition to almost $200 million more in civil penalties. Drug Maker to Pay 
$430 Million in Fines, Civil Damages, FDA CONSUMER, July-Aug. 2004, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/404_wl.html. 
16 The California Attorney General noted in an editorial that in 2002 
Fortune magazine had ranked the prescription drug industry as “No. 1 in 
return on revenues, return on assets and return on equity.” Bill Lockyer, 
Prescription Warning, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 10, 2004, at B7. 
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More important, not since the litigation-hastened demise of 
the very dangerous Dalkon Shield intrauterine device in 197417 
has any pharmaceutical product demonstrated that personal-
injury liability can be a source of social utility. Take Vioxx as 
exemplar of what personal-injury liability has not achieved. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not discover its dangers; the drug had 
already left the market before a jury verdict came in against it; 
increases in talk about improving drug safety policy also had 
predated liability for this drug; and personal-injury litigation did 
not generate information to benefit the consuming public.18 Drug 
industry leaders may well disapprove of personal-injury liability 
as practiced in the United States, and the threat of liability may 
still inhibit what they choose to do.19 But their business has not 
suffered much adversity in court. 
As for law review commentary, writers divide unequally 
between the pro- and anti-liability camps—the former group 
“conservative” in the sense of defending a status quo and 
“liberal” or “progressive” in favoring plaintiffs over corporate 
defendants.20 Its antagonists on the anti-liability side make 
17 The great muckraking journalist Morton Mintz told a devastating story 
in AT ANY COST: WOMEN, CORPORATE GREED, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 
(1985). See also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk 
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1677-79 (1993) (noting the 
information-extracting effects of litigation about this product). The Dalkon 
Shield was a medical device, not a drug; for liability purposes the two cannot 
always be treated alike. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When 
Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. article 4, 36-37 (2006) 
(noting distinctions). 
18 See Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription 
for Drug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569 (2006). 
19 On “the shadow of the law,” see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950 (1979); as affecting this industry, see La Fetra, supra note 4, 
at 646-54 (arguing that drug innovation and development are deterred by “the 
prospect of liability”). But see GREEN, supra note 3, at 339-41 (arguing that 
fears of ruinous liability by drug manufacturers and their advocates are 
exaggerated). 
20 Defenses of prescription-drug liability include JOAN CLAYBROOK, 
RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN’S ATTACK ON AMERICA’S HEALTH (1984); 
THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 101 
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reform proposals; these commentators have offered a variety of 
ideas about how to quell overdeterrence.21 Some seek to rewrite 
negligence doctrine for prescription-drug cases.22 Others would 
exempt a particular sector of the drug industry from tort liability 
generally, on the ground that it is too vital to be put in jeopardy 
by jury adjudication.23 Numerous writers argue for a regulatory 
compliance defense that would establish FDA approval of drug 
design or warning as a shield against liability.24
(2001); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform 
for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997); and (more equivocally) Teresa 
Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the 
Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 431 (1997). 
21 The suggestions surveyed in this paragraph address liability as a 
source of overdeterrence that harms the supply of prescription drugs. Another 
set of writings sites overdeterrence in the FDA itself, and argues that 
Congress or the FDA itself should loosen the agency’s monopoly on drug 
regulation. See Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: 
Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651 (1996) 
(making this argument and summarizing other versions of it); see also 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006) (arguing that by 
imposing high costs of doing business, pharmaceutical regulation threatens 
the supply of new drugs). Other writers go beyond the supply problem and 
ascribe more ill effects to prescription-drug liability. See JUDYTH PENDELL, 
THE ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION, AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, Sept. 2003, at 4-10 
(summarizing a range of complaints about the harms of liability, including 
that warnings are now written with liability rather than therapeutic benefit in 
mind; patients refuse to take a prescribed drug when they have heard a report 
of lawsuits about it; and pharmacists over-warn patients). 
22 Eleanor M. Fox & Michael Traynor, Biotechnology for Human Life 
and Health–The Special Case for a Negligence-Only Rule to Promote Critical 
Innovation, 6 HIGH TECH L.J. 1 (1991). 
23 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4 (proposing no-fault scheme for injuries 
attributed to contraceptives); Dan L. Burk & Barbara Bozcar, Biotechnology 
and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791 
(1994); H. William Smith III, Note, Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine 
Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207 
(1992). 
24 David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription 
Drugs: Who’s in Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 633 (1998) (advocating a 
regulatory compliance defense for design claims); W. Kip Viscusi et al., 
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This above-mentioned “variety of ideas” is not varied: 
homogeneity and stasis characterize the literature about the 
consequences of liability. On the relation between personal-
injury litigation and drug supply, the sounds of alarm already 
noted—early tocsins like Vaccinelessness is coming! and What 
will happen to birth control?—have softened into a more muted 
chorus, with almost all singers holding the same industry-
protective hymnal. Reminiscent of the courts and legislatures 
they study, whose attitudes toward prescription-drug liability 
range from militant loathing to indifference, law review writers 
typically either condemn this corner of personal injury law or 
ignore it. For the condemning cohort, the task of maintaining 
criticism grows less urgent but does not end. Shifts of statutory 
law and judicial doctrine do not entirely eliminate the risk of 
personal injury litigation that faced drug manufacturers in the 
years before tort reform, and so it appears to commentators that 
the problem of personal injury lawsuits will always be with us. 
Stifled innovation, lost cures, and ill health are just what liability 
does. The lament has no terminus in sight, no reason to declare 
victory and celebrate its successes in altering liability law. As 
long as fears of ruinous litigation continue, says the consensus, 
the supply of drugs will remain compromised. 
One may consider a contrary view on this issue—the quaint 
belief, associated with the long-departed Roger Traynor (1900-
1983), who served as chief justice of the California Supreme 
Court in the middle of the twentieth century, that litigation 
seeking redress for the adverse effects of manufactured products 
has good effects on public welfare and safety25—without 
Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for 
the FDA Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437 (1994) 
(including both design and warning). For a judicious look at the proposal, see 
Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The 
Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS L.J. 163 (1998); 
for an exploration of alternatives to a regulatory compliance defense that 
would advance similar ends of uniformity, see David R. Geiger & Mark D. 
Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied 
Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform 
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DE PAUL L. REV. 395 (1996). 
25 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 
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necessarily rejecting the chorus and its hymns. The posture that 
Americans suffer from drug-liability overdeterrence goes 
unchallenged in this Article.26 The question that will get 
attention pertains to the other side in the balance. Personal-
injury litigation causes harm to the drug industry and its 
customers, we shall agree. Does it, or can it, cause good results 
as well? Is there a socially useful role for prescription-drug 
liability? 
In search of social utility—both as it exists at present and the 
incremental benefit that might result from law reform—this 
Article considers effectiveness, the neglected and under-
theorized younger sibling of prescription drug safety.27 It 
recommends that courts deem ineffectiveness an actionable 
injury. Courts already extend this recognition when they hear 
claims for deceptive practices based on inaccuracy in 
pharmaceutical labeling. Yet deception does not cover all the 
harm that ineffective drugs cause. An ineffective drug is also a 
source of bodily injury. One manageable way to acknowledge 
this physical harm would be to permit a plaintiff who suffered 
1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 462-64 
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and 
Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 375 
(1965). 
26 The pro-liability literature, see supra note 20, works at a high level of 
generality: dangerous side effects, corporate venality, hurt victims, 
inadequate regulation. For a more pointed look at whether prescription-drug 
liability enhances the public good, see Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story–An 
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968). 
Rheingold, a litigator representing plaintiffs, argues that the defendant 
corporation suffered when its stock price dived “disastrously,” id. at 143-44, 
and that concerted activity by the lawyers gave injured people more effective 
representation. Id. at 147. To this extent, the litigation was successful. But 
Rheingold found little or no improvements to the industry, regulators, or the 
furnishing of medical care. 
27 Safety is already covered in the pro-liability literature, which defends 
personal-injury chiefly litigation as a way to protect persons who consume 
prescription drugs from dangerous side effects. See supra note 20. Like the 
thesis expressed in this paper, these claims of safety-enhancing policy seek to 
do some of the work of the FDA. On effectiveness in contrast to efficacy, see 
infra Part I.B. 
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from a drug’s lack of safety to recover—if and only if she can 
prove that the drug did not live up to the claims on its label—for 
its ineffectiveness as well.28
As legal concepts, safety and effectiveness reside in statutory 
law: a manufacturer may not sell a drug in interstate commerce 
unless the federal government has deemed it safe (per New Deal 
legislation, enacted in 1938, which empowered the Food and 
Drug Administration to ban the sale of unsafe drugs) and also, 
since 1962, effective. Ex ante determinations of safety and 
effectiveness are the province of regulation rather than liability 
law, but courts recognize the concepts in personal injury 
litigation using their own vocabulary: drugs that are not “safe 
and effective” in regulatory jargon might also be defective 
products, unreasonably dangerous manufactured goods, the 
result of a breach of the seller’s duty, and the instantiation of 
negligence or strict products liability. 
Liability doctrine has long manifested awareness of its 
connection to drug safety. The first encyclopedic statement about 
prescription drug liability in the United States, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment k, published in 1965, 
declared that if the benefits of a prescription drug “outweigh its 
known risks, and if the manufacturer has provided suitable 
warnings and directions for use, the defendant’s product will be 
deemed reasonably safe, and the plaintiff will not recover.”29 
Courts that accept this formulation not only immunize 
  
28
 The exact nature of this recovery could take many forms. Time will 
need to pass before ineffectiveness becomes accepted among tort lawyers and 
judges as a source of physical injury. For beginning steps, this Article 
proposes expanding ineffectiveness as a constituent of current doctrine 
regarding defect and danger, and as it pertains to punitive damages. See infra 
Part III. 
29 See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against 
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 855 (1983) 
(offering this paraphrase). Comment k is notoriously hard to fathom. Aaron 
Twerski, a co-Reporter for the successor Restatement, used to tell his 
Products Liability students that anyone in the class who could explain it to 
him would get an A. Aaron D. Twerski, From a Reporter’s Perspective: A 
Proposed Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1993). 
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prescription drugs from design-defect liability, 30 a stance for 
which some commentary criticizes them,31 but also equate 
design defect with lack of safety, omitting from consideration 
the other drug-approval criterion of effectiveness—a judicial 
omission about which commentary has been silent. The apt 
remark that prescription-drug liability in the United States is all 
about warning rather than design32 also presumes the ascendancy 
of safety over effectiveness, because the danger of harmful 
effects can be named in a warning much more clearly than the 
danger of futility. 
In defending the manufacturer-friendly rule they wrote to 
govern liability for harms caused by prescription drugs, the 
reporters of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
claimed that the standard Traynorian rationales about deterrence 
and safety incentives do not apply to prescription drugs: unlike 
manufacturers of other types of goods, drug manufacturers 
cannot sell their products before they receive a government 
proclamation of safety and effectiveness, and they reap 
extraordinary profits when they can promote their goods as 
better than their competitors’. Thus these sellers already “face 
adequate incentives to innovate to make drugs better and safer 
independently of incentives supplied by tort law.”33 They will 
emphasize safety to hone their competitive edge, because “drugs 
that cause serious negative side-effects are especially vulnerable 
30 E.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).  See also 
Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying 
Washington law); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). 
31 George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1118-27 (2000); Richard 
L. Cupp, Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The 
Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 76 (1994); Page, supra note 29, at 865-67. 
32 Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the 
Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 
209 (1999). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 6 cmt. d (1998) (calling warning “the major basis” of liability for 
prescription drugs and devices). 
33 James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs are 
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 179 (2001). 
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to new alternatives not protected by the patent system.”34 
Though mindful of effectiveness, this view of liability sees 
effectiveness as extrinsic to personal injury litigation. 
This Article explores the contrary thesis that effectiveness is, 
and ought to be, central to personal injury litigation related to 
prescription drugs, particularly at a time when neither the 
market nor regulation is attaining this social good, its presence 
in a strongly worded statute notwithstanding.35 Part I explores 
the rule—on the books now for 45 years yet still extraordinary—
that those who would sell one particular product in interstate 
commerce must prove (by “substantial evidence,” no less) that 
their product is effective. Though extraordinary, this criterion 
for premarketing approval is fixed, very popular, and almost 
entirely devoid of controversy. It responds to an enormous 
problem: ineffective drugs fill a landscape of calamitous waste 
and harm.36 Among those who suffer from this harm, the 
34 Id. 
35 For a remote yet pertinent analogy one might go back again to the 
middle of the twentieth century, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, 
when civil rights activists, led by Thurgood Marshall, resorted to the courts 
not because they wanted to build famous case precedents culminating in 
Brown v. Board of Education but because they saw no other cure for 
powerlessness, disenfranchisement, and lack of protection from the rule of 
law. Their celebrated “litigation strategy” was costly, fatiguing, dispiriting, 
and dangerous. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A 
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
81 (1994). In raising the analogy, I wish to be clear that as a social problem, 
ineffectiveness in any consumer product, not just drugs, is inherently suited 
less to litigation than the reparative reach of markets, in which the public can 
abjure deleterious items, and regulation, which curbs their tendency to injure. 
Only because of the inadequacy of these measures in practice does this 
Article seek to enlist litigants and judges in the work of demonstrating in 
court the connection between drug ineffectiveness and lack of safety. On the 
relation between the roughly contemporaneous expansion of tort remedies and 
civil rights in the United States, see Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein? Not 
Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 13 & n. 27 (2004) 
(citing Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 610-12 (1992)). 
36 Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical 
Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 
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Article focuses, at the end of Part I and in more detail in Part 
II, on consumers, a group that includes physicians, patients, and 
third-party payors. Once the contention about harm is 
established, it becomes proper to envision legal remedies for a 
wrong recognized in law. The proposals offered at the end of 
the Article pay heed to particular players while recognizing that 
many more are hurt by ineffective drugs, and many other 
remedies for this social ill might exist: Part III addresses trial 
judges presiding over actions brought by patients who attribute 
injury to the prescription drugs they took.37
I.  WHAT IS AN EFFECTIVE DRUG? 
In 1962, the requirement that drugs be effective became 
federal law in Section 505 of the Food Drug Cosmetic Act, 
which directed the Secretary of what is now the Department of 
Health and Services—in practice, the FDA—to withhold 
approval of a new drug unless the government has “substantial 
evidence” of its effectiveness.38 This directive raises several 
questions. First, what does the effectiveness criterion add to the 
older safety criterion for approval? Second, which effects are 
784-98 (1986) (depicting “waste” in medical treatments, a category that 
includes ineffective drugs, as a problem too large to be solved). 
37 For another policy prescription aimed at judges but used for a 
different goal, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 172 (offering a section of 
liability-limiting suggestions under the caption “How Courts Should Handle 
Prescription Drug Litigation”). Another complementary subject is consumer 
fraud litigation for deceptive claims of safety and effectiveness, a cause of 
action that one trio of defense lawyers has described as likely to grow more 
favored by the plaintiffs’ bar. Joseph J. Leghorn, Christopher Allen, Jr., and 
Tavares Brewington, Defending an Emerging Threat: Consumer Fraud Class 
Action Suits in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Products-Based 
Litigation, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519 (2006). Consumer fraud claims are 
based on state deceptive-practices statutes, typically do not involve physically 
injured plaintiffs, and often include attempts to obtain class certification. See 
id. By contrast, this paper looks at effectiveness as a constituent of personal 
injury claims and focuses on common law doctrine. See infra part III. 
Hewing mostly to state tort law, I do not address class actions, an 
increasingly federalized domain. 
38 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2004). 
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contemplated in the word “effective”? Third, what classes of 
consumers and which of their interests does the statute address? 
A. An Extraordinary Mandate 
Americans now take the rule for granted, but it remains 
remarkable that Congress chose to forbid the marketing of one 
particular ineffective product in interstate commerce. Regulation 
of consumer products typically seeks to avert acute danger rather 
than futility or failure. A banned substance in the United States 
is usually a hazardous substance, and at the time of the 1962 
amendments, prescription drugs already had to be approved as 
safe before marketing. Effectiveness is not entirely alien to 
regulation, of course.39 Nevertheless, in a market economy 
effectiveness normally emerges through manifested behaviors—
customers choose; they buy; they come back to buy again—
rather than, so to speak, by prescription. 
Critics have long proposed that federal law jettison or 
restrict the effectiveness criterion for prescription-drug approval. 
Going beyond the libertarian premise that it is wrong to ban the 
sale of a thing not known to harm or endanger anyone, they 
invoke the public weal, contending that because manufacturers 
must produce substantial evidence of effectiveness before the 
FDA will approve their new-drug applications, it becomes 
plausible to surmise that useful therapies will fail the stringent 
test and remain off the market.40 Moreover, drugs that really are 
effective—some powerful enough to save lives—cannot reach 
patients’ bodies until years of testing have gone by, and so the 
critique posits martyrdom: an unknown number (more than zero) 
of dead or very sick people would be alive or healthy today had 
39 Licensing to ensure professional competence, for example, might be 
seen not only to seek safety for clients but to help give clients satisfactory 
affirmative results. 
40 Economist Sam Peltzman published his estimates in several papers and 
SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INFORMATION: THE 1962 
AMENDMENTS (1974). He testified before Congress in 1973 that the nation 
was losing more than $450 million per year in gross therapeutic benefits as a 
result of the effectiveness criterion. Price, supra note 21, at 654 n.21. 
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they received an effective treatment in time.41 Other 
commentary that might be labeled libertarian-contrarian suggests 
that requiring effectiveness as a condition of sale reduces the 
impact of placebos—and a placebo does have an effect of its 
own.42
Contemporary political conditions keep these ideas for 
libertarian reform permanently outside the United States Code. 
Pharmaceutical companies have been working with, not just 
grumbling about, the effectiveness criterion for many years, and 
would not embrace the uncertainty of some unknown alternative 
standard. They also value the criterion as a barrier to 
competitors’ entering their market.43 Even if manufacturers were 
to endorse repeal, the public would resist it. “Safe and effective 
drugs” seems to be a winning slogan. The effectiveness criterion 
drew enthusiasm in 1962 that went beyond bipartisanship: a 
unanimous vote in Congress, hearty support from the consumer-
minded President Kennedy, and no opposition from the 
industry.44 Today the FDA takes its share of criticism but still 
enjoys strong approval ratings—more than two-thirds of 
41 Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, 
REGULATION MAGAZINE, Summer 2004, at 60, 63; see also Elizabeth A. 
Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of Off-
Label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 662 (1999) (noting that the effectiveness 
mandate has added two years to the amount of time it takes the FDA to 
approve a new drug application). 
42 One health-law scholar explores the placebo effect in the context of 
informed consent and concludes that it might be ethical to conceal from one’s 
patient that a treatment is a placebo. Kathleen M. Boozang, The Therapeutic 
Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2002). The 
same reasoning supports a modification of the effectiveness criterion for drug 
approval. At present, the FDA interprets “substantial evidence” as requiring, 
as a condition for approval, that the manufacturer of a drug demonstrate 
clinical effects beyond what a placebo would achieve. See 21 C.F.R. 
314.126(b)(2)(i.) (2006). 
43 Thanks to David Schoenbrod for telling me so. 
44 PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, 
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 161 (2003); MORTON 
MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE 44-54, 71 (1965). 
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Americans hold the agency and its work in high regard45—in an 
era when both elites and ordinary citizens feel hostile or 
skeptical toward federal bureaucracies.46
Judges have interpreted the effectiveness criterion for 
approval with some severity, holding that consumers have no 
right to partake of drugs not approved as effective. The most 
compelling category of plaintiffs to protest this stance would be 
terminally ill patients, who can credibly say they are about to 
die anyway and so should be allowed an unapproved drug for 
whatever effects (perhaps placebo effects) that it might offer.47 
Yet even plaintiffs in this sympathetic group, patients who 
wanted a nostrum to treat advanced cancer, were rebuffed in 
1979 by a unanimous Supreme Court.48 Recently the libertarian 
effort enjoyed a triumph in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, which found that terminally ill patients had a 
constitutional right of access to a drug that had passed 
preliminary safety studies and had not yet been approved as 
effective.49 However, the triumph was short-lived—the court 
45 Rita Rubin, Can Americans Trust Their Medicine?, USA TODAY, Dec. 
20, 2004 at A1 (reporting on a survey taken in November 2004, a difficult 
time for drug manufacturers and regulators, suggesting 70 percent of 
Americans have confidence in the FDA); Hilts, supra note 44, at 235 
(reporting consistency of this popularity and noting that in 1995 Newt 
Gingrich, then a member of Congress, went down after a misfired attack on 
the agency). A 1980s survey identified the FDA as the nation’s second-most 
popular federal agency, behind the National Parks Service. Sharon Smith 
Holston, FDA Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs, The Value of 
Patient’s Perspective in FDA’s Decision Process, speech delivered Nov. 3, 
1997, available at http://www.fda.gov/oashi/cancer/value.html. 
46 See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: 
THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 13 (2002) (attributing 
American litigiousness in part to a national suspicion about bureaucratic 
power). 
47 One father of a young child who died of cancer after being denied an 
unapproved drug treatment makes a poignant case for expanded access in 
Michael E. Horwin, Comment, “War on Cancer”: Why Does the FDA Deny 
Access to Alternative Cancer Treatments?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 189 (2001). 
48 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979). The drug 
these patients wanted was the notorious Laetrile. 
49 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
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vacated the judgment50—and so, at least at the moment, the 
extraordinary mandate of satisfactory results before marketing 
remains in place as far as legislators, regulators, courts, the 
drug industry, and most of the American public are concerned. 
The mandate suggests a next step for courts to take. Federal 
law proscribes the sale of ineffective drugs; courts interpreting 
this law declare that consumers have no right to ineffective 
drugs. From here, one may infer that when consumers receive 
drugs that, unknown to them, are ineffective, they have suffered 
an infringement of their rights. The Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act 
provides no private right of action for this injury, but furnishing 
redress to victims who already have other routes to the courts 
would honor their right to drug effectiveness. 
B.  Effectiveness versus Efficacy 
It now becomes necessary to consider what “effective” 
means—and also what it might be mistaken to mean. Here we 
contrast effectiveness with efficacy; for this purpose the two 
nouns are not synonyms. This discussion postpones the concept 
of “comparative effectiveness” (also known by similar terms like 
“relative efficacy”), which is not present in the four corners of 
the statute.51
Congress wrote an implicit definition of the word “effective” 
in the 1962 amendments, declaring that the federal government 
must prohibit the sale of any drug if “there is a lack of 
substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports 
or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”52 
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 472, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This action was 
financed by the Washington Legal Foundation. Abigail Alliance distinguished 
Rutherford on the ground that Laetrile had never received safety approval. 
50 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 21, 2006). Additional litigation was pending when this Article went to 
press in the summer of 2007. 
51 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
52 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2004). 
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This meaning of “effective” distinguishes effectiveness from 
efficacy.53 Efficacy refers to the propensity of a drug to achieve 
intended, observable clinical improvement, with “improvement” 
in turn referring to metrics rather than a feeling of good health. 
An anti-hypertensive drug is efficacious if it lowers blood 
pressure, even if the patient has no consciousness of 
improvement, because (in most cases and ceteris parabus) the 
lowering of abnormally high blood pressure is a salubrious 
change. 
Effectiveness, by contrast, refers to the fit between what 
happens to patients and what manufacturers promise on drug 
labels. An example of a drug that achieves efficacy but not 
effectiveness might be the anti-hypertensive mentioned above, 
when it functions to lower blood pressure but not by as many 
millimeters as its manufacturer asserts that it will. A drug called 
Lovenox, the top-seller in its category (low molecular weight 
heparins), provides an example of effectiveness that may or may 
not deliver efficacy. Lovenox, the trade name for enoxaparin, 
promises to reduce the incidence of deep-vein thrombosis. 
Approximately a third of the patients who experience deep-vein 
thrombosis go on to experience pulmonary embolism; 
approximately a third of the patients who experience pulmonary 
embolism die. For most patients, by this reckoning, Lovenox is 
an idle substance that does their mortality and morbidity 
prospects no good. But it does do what its label says it will do—
reduce the incidence of deep-vein thrombosis—and so in 1993 it 
won its FDA-approved effectiveness wings.54 In the vocabulary 
53 Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New 
Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization 
Act of 1997, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 127, 132-34 (1999). Although the words 
have different meanings, many people use them interchangeably. When the 
FDA studied drug effectiveness soon after the passage of the 1962 
amendments, for example, it referred to its review as the Drug Efficacy 
Study Implementation, even though the object of the study was to see whether 
drugs lived up to the promises on their labels. 
54 See generally Bruce L. Davidson, Controversies in Pulmonary 
Embolism and Deep Venous Thrombosis, 60 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1269 
(1999) (summarizing the history and uses of Lovenox in treating these 
conditions). 
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of another profession, efficacy invokes a tort-like failure to 
achieve improvement, while effectiveness, the codified criterion, 
is grounded in an implied-in-law contract between buyer and 
seller. 
C.  The Effectiveness Contract 
Identifying the buyer is more complex then identifying the 
seller. We know the seller. Since most prescription drugs are 
carefully branded, at least during their period of patent life, 
identification issues found elsewhere in products liability 
conveniently disappear. Identifying the buyer—or, more 
precisely, the consumer—is more difficult; one cannot rest with 
the Uniform Commercial Code’s definition of a buyer as “a 
person that buys or contracts to buy goods.”55 There are three 
categories of drug buyer in the United States, each with its own 
mix of expectations regarding effectiveness.56
1.  Three Types of Consumers 
Physicians comprise one cohort of consumers. The Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 bestowed on them the 
prerogative to direct purchases of prescription drugs. Other 
people may swallow drugs or apply them to their bodies, while 
yet other people pay for them; but assent from a physician is 
necessary to the transaction. For decades, every drug 
manufacturer targeted virtually all of its advertising and 
promotion to this class of buyers, and today most of this 
promotional effort still goes to them. 
Patients are the group is usually what commentators have in 
mind when they refer to “direct to consumer” marketing or 
advertising by drug manufacturers. It is patients who in 
physiological terms interact with, use up, or metabolize this 
product. The category of patients includes, at one end of a 
55 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a). 
56 This section summarizes a longer discussion in Bernstein & Bernstein, 
supra note 18. 
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spectrum, passive recipients (e.g., children, emergency victims, 
unconscious and mentally incapacitated persons), who receive 
drug treatments without their consent, and, at the other end, 
highly informed patients who pick out the drug they want first 
and seek a prescription second. In the middle of the spectrum 
are adults with a say in their drug selection who, to varying 
degrees, depend on the advice and discretion of their physicians. 
As buyers, few patients pay the official, stated retail price of the 
prescription drugs they consume. 
Third-party payors include governments (notably Medicaid at 
the state level, some federal programs like the Veterans 
Administration, and more recently Medicare), insurers, and 
some employers that administer health plans. It is they who best 
fit the U.C.C.’s “contracts to buy” definition of a buyer, as they 
do most of their drug purchasing in bulk and, unlike physicians 
and patients, are positioned to negotiate terms with the seller. 
Third-party payors use formularies as a principal cost-
containment device.57 Formularies, which in pharmacology are 
lists “of pharmaceutical substances along with their formulas, 
uses, and methods of preparations,”58 are for third-party payors 
databases that tell them which drugs to prefer for the treatment 
of which conditions. 
2.  Effectiveness as Consumers Seek It 
All three categories of consumers want prescription drugs to 
be both safe and effective; each has a slightly different set of 
desires. For physicians, safety is paramount. Their professional 
oath exhorts them to do no harm, rather than to achieve results. 
57 For an expression of squeamishness on this point from one formulary 
authority, see Association of Managed Care Pharmacies, Format for 
Voluntary Submissions iv (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.fmcpnet.org/ 
data/resource/Format~Version_2_1~Final_Final.pdf (“Users should always 
keep in mind that the Format [to be used by formulary writers] is not a cost-
containment device but an analytic tool to improve the value of health care 
delivered.”). 
58 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(4th ed. 2000). 
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Physicians value safety higher than effectiveness: in their 
perspective, futile treatments can be scrapped and supplanted in 
a trial-and-error effort, but dangerous effects can at best be 
mitigated, never undone. For patients, the two adjectives are of 
more equal weight. Since they are suffering from the vexations 
of a pathological condition more directly than physicians, they 
may value effectiveness more than safety. 
Third-party payors introduce another priority to the mix: 
they are especially keen on comparative effectiveness.59 Because 
they deal with large numbers of patients, they regard 
prescription drugs in the aggregate rather than as a tailored 
response by one provider to benefit one individual. In this 
respect this buyer-consumer is more like the seller than are the 
other two consumers. Both manufacturers and third-party 
payors, as businesses, focus on revenue: “sales” for the 
industry, “cost” for the payors. Both are relatively uninterested 
in limited-marked “boutique” products to treat rare conditions.60
The action, as far as both manufacturers and third-party 
payors are concerned, is in products that reach millions of 
patients with chronic conditions: drugs to lower cholesterol and 
blood pressure and blood sugar; drugs for mental illnesses that 
are either very common (such as depression) or relatively 
common and very costly not to treat (schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder); painkillers; asthma treatments; palliatives for gastric 
symptoms; and industry Holy Grails (an HIV vaccine, a drug 
that would safely let people eat whatever they want without 
gaining weight). For manufacturers, such drugs pour profits into 
their bottom line. For the third-party payor, they are what its 
physicians and patients feel entitled to receive and what it too 
sometimes has an incentive to want: a good drug can improve a 
payor’s bottom line, perhaps by reducing hospital stays or 
permitting a patient to work more productively. The third-party 
payor knows it has to buy such drugs. But not all of them, as if 
59 Although “comparative efficacy” would be a more precise locution, 
see supra Part I.B., this Article uses “comparative effectiveness” because it 
is more familiar. 
60 See generally Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 18 (elaborating on 
this discussion of expectations). 
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they were all exactly like others in their class. When good 
generic substitutes are available, a payor would prefer them to a 
patented product. When generics are unacceptable, or not 
available, the payor choosing among brands wants the best bang 
for its buck. 
Everyone, to be sure—even manufacturers—welcomes safety, 
effectiveness, and comparative effectiveness; these three desires 
are noted not so much to separate each buyer from the other two 
as to introduce the third desideratum. Although comparative 
effectiveness is not mentioned as a criterion for approval in the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, increasingly the federal and 
state governments have been pursuing it as policy.61 Times have 
changed since 1962: back when Congress passed the 
effectiveness amendments, far fewer drugs were available, and 
the rise of competitive markets to treat particular conditions had 
not yet been envisioned.62 In the twenty-first century, for 
example, a prescriber must strain to think of tricyclic drugs as 
“effective” for depression, notwithstanding their decades-old 
undisturbed approval under the effectiveness criterion, because 
competitor drugs, especially selective serotinin reuptake 
inhibitors, work so much better. This space in the effectiveness 
contract—between what regulators understand to be the law 
governing premarketing approval and the sets of expectations 
and entitlements that develop around a statute—is amenable to 
input from the courts. 
Effectiveness as customers seek it, in sum, includes both 
halves of the effectiveness/efficacy division: customers want 
drugs to live up to the promises on their labels, and they want 
improved therapeutic outcomes. “Improved,” in their view, 
relates not only to a patient’s antecedent physiological state but 
also to what alternative treatments would deliver. Although 
judicial competence is more pertinent to the first desire 
(“effectiveness”) than the second (“efficacy”), judges can help 
61 Id. 
62 Robert D. Reischauer, Prescription Drug Coverage and Medicare, 
Sept. 28, 1999, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/ 
reischauer/19990928.htm. 
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to fulfill both. 63  
C.  The Judicial Role in Determining or Ensuring that Drugs 
are Effective 
In contrast to its approach to safety,64 the judiciary has 
delineated a narrow role for itself with respect to drug 
effectiveness. Judges interpreting state law governing personal-
injury claims do not consider effectiveness, manifesting a belief 
that in their courtrooms litigants are entitled to drug safety but 
not the other criterion for drug approval. Judges interpreting 
federal statutes deal with effectiveness only as a matter of 
administrative law, reviewing agency actions. 
1.  Inside the Beltway 
The unavailing claim in United States v. Rutherford by 
patients seeking access to a drug not approved65 fits in a wider 
jurisprudence of federal courts disinclined to enforce the 
effectiveness mandate of Section 505. In its stated rights of 
action, the statute recognizes only a manufacturer’s appeal from 
the denial of a new drug application:66 following such a denial, 
a manufacturer will in some circumstances have a right to a 
hearing.67 The court that holds appellate power over federal 
administrative decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, has expressed unwillingness to hear 
effectiveness-related claims from consumers.68
63 See infra Part II.A. 
64 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
65 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
66 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2004). 
67 Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973) 
(cautioning that in order to be entitled to a hearing, the manufacturer must 
have submitted evidence of effectiveness). 
68 Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that 
consumers have only very limited standing to compel the FDA to complete a 
mandated study of the effectiveness of over-the-counter drugs). 
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2.  Toward an Entitlement to Effectiveness, Enforced in 
Federal and State Courts 
Away from the regulatory-review docket of the D.C. 
Circuit, courts have not yet confronted the question of whether 
individuals who allege injuries that they attribute to prescription 
drugs may seek redress for ineffectiveness as well as lack of 
safety. Consumers who use state-level deceptive practices 
legislation to contend that promises of effects constituted 
deception have had mixed results in court.69 The litigant 
envisioned in this Article is a different type of consumer, one 
bringing a tort-based claim of negligence or strict products 
liability against a drug manufacturer for physical injuries. Our 
plaintiff ascribes her injury to the deficient design or warning 
that the drug manufacturer chose. 
Defects in warning and design equate to lack of safety; in 
our scenario, the plaintiff objects to lack of effectiveness as 
well. Although a litigant who suffered a physical injury from a 
drug is a patient rather than a physician or a third-party payor, 
this claim of injury necessarily includes harms to the other two 
types of consumer: a physician’s opportunity to practice 
medicine satisfactorily is impaired by ineffective drugs, and any 
third party who bought this drug received poorer value than 
what it sought. The patient-plaintiff should not receive 
compensation for injuries to these consumers, of course; they 
are not present as parties. A judge should, however, remember 
the nonparties when reflecting on the overdeterrence chorus with 
which we began. As buyers who participate in sales of this same 
good, they too suffered the injury of ineffectiveness of which the 
plaintiff complaints. If this type of litigation tends to ameliorate 
the harms of ineffective drugs, then these nonparties would 
benefit accordingly. 
Our judge might raise doubts at this point. Does 
ineffectiveness really inflict personal injury? Even if it does, 
would recognition of an effectiveness-based claim in a personal 
69 See Leghorn et al., supra note 37 (summarizing results, from a 
manufacturer’s perspective). 
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injury action usurp the functions of Congress and the FDA by 
arrogating to the judiciary a subject that Congress has claimed 
for itself and assigned to regulators? These questions are taken 
up in the next part. Part II answers the first with a resounding 
Yes—and this affirmative, a conclusion about gross rather than 
net injury, is undiminished by evidence that the effectiveness 
criterion hurts consumers;70 regulation can do good and harm at 
the same time.71 Part III answers No to the second question, and 
recommends modifications of existing doctrine to articulate a 
role for courts in enforcing drug effectiveness. 
II.  SOME HARMS TO CONSUMERS CAUSED BY INEFFECTIVE, 
COMPARATIVELY INEFFECTIVE, AND INEFFICACIOUS DRUGS 
Judicial clinging to metaphors of absence and inaction—the 
dog that didn’t bark,72 the gun that didn’t go off73—to describe a 
drug that fails to achieve clinical improvement, or to honor the 
promises on its label, will leave undisturbed the current 
understanding about the incompetence of personal-injury law to 
enhance drug effectiveness. The conventional divide will endure. 
Product safety versus products liability, ex ante versus ex post, 
70 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
71 Airline deregulation lowered prices and took away legroom. 
Professional monopolies protect clients and raise fees. Zoning laws make 
residences homier at the price of lost freedoms. Government-mandated 
disclosures to investors convey information and tedium in the same 
document. 
72 In the famous colloquy between a Scotland Yard detective and 
Sherlock Holmes: 
 “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my 
attention?” 
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” 
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 
“That was the curious incident.” 
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE (1892), available at 
http://www.classic-literature.co.uk/silver-blaze/. 
73 Celia Wren, Chekhov’s Plays, COMMONWEAL, May 3, 1996, at 18 
(referring to the famous dictum that “a gun hanging on the wall in the first 
act of a play must fire before the close of the final scene”). 
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regulation versus adjudication, prevention of harm versus 
remedy of harm: in this view, effectiveness and efficacy have no 
place in court. Regulators should continue to apply the statutory 
effectiveness criterion to new-drug applications, and when drugs 
prove unsafe in use—when they hurt someone—then liability will 
bring in its labels: defect, unreasonably dangerous, strict 
liability, negligence, failure to warn. “Ineffective,” as seen here, 
is not found in the liability lexicon. 
This view is misguided: ineffectiveness, in this respect just 
like lack of safety, harms drug consumers. The stance that 
regulatory compliance does not immunize manufacturers from 
liability—still in place around the country except where the odd 
state legislature has installed a change—indicates that packaging 
their drugs consistent with FDA decrees for the label also should 
not give them immunity. Whether or not harms attributable to 
ineffectiveness ought to be actionable in the courts, they exist, 
and deserve consideration in any contemplation of the judicial 
role in remedying ineffectiveness. 
A.  Pathologies Unaddressed 
The notion that drugs lacking in safety cause injury and 
drugs lacking in efficacy do nothing fails to reckon with the 
reason drugs are manufactured, prescribed, and ingested: to alter 
the body, pursuant to a determination that such an alteration is 
necessary to ameliorate or prevent a pathological state. Injury is 
the condition against which a drug acts. When the drug does not 
do what its label promises, or does not make the patient better 
off, then the patient suffers from, at a minimum, whatever 
remains of the underlying condition the drug was supposed to 
fix.74 In this sense the drug is responsible for some portion of 
the patient’s injury, comparable to the way tort law holds some 
74 One litigant who before his death sought access to an unapproved 
drug, Joel Oppenheim, reported “dangerous and damaging” effects from 
approved, conventional treatments. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. Van Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 134-35 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); see also Horwin, supra note 47 (reporting the travails of the author’s 
son). 
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defendants responsible under negligence doctrine for physical 
injuries that they did not actively inflict if they had a duty to act 
affirmatively to protect or rescue plaintiffs and did not fulfill this 
duty. 
To continue the analogy from negligence law, one exception 
to the common law rule of no duty to rescue another person 
arises from an undertaking. A defendant who ordinarily would 
have no obligation to benefit the plaintiff acquires this obligation 
through affirmative conduct, and becomes liable for injuries 
resulting from the failure to act.75 Prevailing plaintiffs usually 
establish that “undertaking” defendants in effect fended off 
alternative sources of help, leaving them isolated and dependent 
on this solitary source of rescue. Because prescription drugs 
consumed by patients have prevailed in a competition, they too 
are not inert in the mode of a dog that doesn’t bark. Sellers put 
their products forward as interventions. They displaced at least 
one alternative—to do nothing—and for most medical conditions 
also prevailed over nonpatented treatments and competitor 
pharmaceuticals. 
Here the gap between efficacy, or clinical improvement, and 
effectiveness, understood by American regulatory law to mean 
different enough from a placebo in response rates to support a 
promise on a label, becomes vivid. Few drugs are efficacious. 
When a senior executive of the biggest pharmaceuticals company 
in Britain said publicly in 2003 that “most prescription 
medicines do not work on most people who take them,”76 his 
remark came across as both a “gaffe” and the telling of “an 
open secret.”77 Drugs for Alzheimer’s disease work for fewer 
than one in three patients. Cancer drugs work for fewer than 
one out of four. Drugs for migraines, osteoporosis, and arthritis 
are more efficacious, working about half the time. The best 
antidepressant drugs help about two-thirds of patients, but some 
large fraction of the group that enjoys improvement, perhaps 30-
75 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 860-69 (2001) 
(detailing this basis of liability for physical injury). 
76 Steve Connor, Glaxo Chief: Our Drugs Do Not Work on Most 
Patients, THE INDEP., Dec. 8, 2003. 
77 Id. 
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50 percent, would have done as well with placebos.78 
Unsatisfactory compliance by patients accounts for some of the 
disappointing results, but experts ascribe more of the failure to 
genotypes: many patients do not benefit because they are 
physically incapable of responding to even “effective” drugs.79
At first blush, this gloomy story about lack of efficacy in 
practice might support more despair than reformist energy. After 
all, if manufacturers, physicians, and patients, all amply 
motivated to sell and buy the best drugs, do not achieve 
improvement through pharmaceutical intervention, what can 
personal-injury doctrine do? Still, the efficacy record shows 
opportunity as well as failure. Judges who contribute to even 
small gains in drug efficacy would make relatively large changes 
to the policy landscape, because the quantity of actual clinical 
improvement is small. Improving effectiveness is only one step 
away, as the promise that a manufacturer wants most to make on 
its label is one of likely clinical improvement. Bringing efficacy 
and effectiveness into the personal-injury courtroom would also 
help to clarify and expound on the useful distinction between the 
two words. Efficacy may remain elusive, given the limitations of 
even a mighty industry, but effectiveness will get better after 
courts do more to encourage accuracy in labeling; and the need 
for accuracy holds promise for improving research and 
development. 
B.  Money Wasted 
We return to cost-effectiveness and comparative 
effectiveness, concerns that preoccupy everyone who pays for 
prescription drugs, especially third-party payors. Most of the 
time, anyone buying medications will want to get the maximum 
clinical improvement for the minimum expenditure, or at least 
will consider cost as a variable.80 This desire underlies 
78 Joe & Teresa Graedon, Some Prescription Drugs Don’t Work as 
Advertised, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 13, 2004, at D2. 
79 Connor, supra note 76. 
80 Commentators make this point while contending that the effectiveness 
criterion is obsolete in the managed-care era. See Note, FDA Reform and the 
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formularies, the drug-selecting apparatus already mentioned.81
The premise behind formularies is that a third-party payor 
will waste a significant amount of money if it does not consider 
cheaper alternatives to whichever drug that someone else who 
doesn’t have to pay the price—a patient, a prescribing physician, 
a promotion-minded manufacturer—suggests to them that they 
buy.82 The premise appears sound. According to a 1998 study, 
physicians write 30 million prescriptions a year for ineffective 
drugs in Britain, wasting more than £100 million of National 
Health Service money.83 No comparable “wastestimate” exists 
for the United States, which lacks a solitary payor comparable to 
the British NHS, but simple extrapolation from American drug 
futility generally—the high failure rate of drugs84 multiplied by 
its much larger population—suggests a figure many times 
higher.85
This aspect of harm receives only partial expression by 
plaintiffs in personal-injury litigation. Patients who ingest drugs 
without clinical improvement, along with their families, may 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2019-23 
(1995) (arguing that in contrast to 1962, today managed-care organizations 
have incentives to enforce effectiveness); Henry I. Miller, Vaccine 
Development a Casualty of Flawed Public Policy, Hoover Institution Weekly 
Essays, May 5, 2003, available at http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/ 
pubaffairs/we/2003/miller05.html (arguing that managed-care organizations 
will not support an ineffective vaccine). 
81 See supra notes 57-58. 
82 Ironically, third-party payors can achieve comparable waste by 
refusing to consider a more expensive drug. International donors operating in 
Africa have refused to buy an extremely effective antimalarial drug, 
artemisinin-combination therapy or ACT, because chloroquine-derived drugs 
are cheaper, even though evolution has now rendered chloroquine almost 
useless in combating malaria. Cynthia Scharf, Op-Ed, There is a Drug that 
Works: A Matter of Money Against Malaria, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 21, 
2004, at 8. 
83 Millions Spent on ‘Ineffective Drugs,’ BBC News, Oct. 27, 1998, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/202251.stm. 
84 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
85 Britain does have a more lenient effectiveness criterion for 
premarketing approval, however. See FDA Reform and the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency, supra note 80, at 2014. 
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feel cheated or that they have wasted their money, but most of 
the loss attributed to the waste is not theirs.86 Furthermore, to 
the extent that ineffectiveness (and inefficacy) are the patients’ 
own fault (they may have unreasonably failed to comply with a 
drug regimen, for example), they will seldom suffer a financial 
penalty in the way that contributory negligence reduces a 
plaintiff’s compensation. Empowering plaintiffs to recover for 
drug ineffectiveness (or inefficacy), then, cannot restore the 
amount of money wasted on ineffective and inefficacious drugs. 
It would, however, force manufacturers to internalize part of the 
loss that they created. 
C.  Unnecessary Toxic Effects 
In the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—the first federal 
law that referred to limited-sale “prescription” drugs that only a 
physician could choose87—Congress made safety a condition for 
approval by the FDA. The reason for this new safety mandate? 
Lack of safety, inherent in the category, and incapable of 
elimination: prescription drugs are those drugs with “toxicity or 
other potentiality for harmful effect” that renders them “not safe 
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by 
law.”88 Further recognizing that danger is a sine qua non of all 
prescription drugs, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has never 
purported to define safety as an aspect of drugs, even though in 
1962 Congress went on to say much about what it means for a 
drug to be effective. The Food and Drug Administration, 
moreover, does define safety in its regulation of other products. 
For example, food additives may not be sold unless regulators 
find “reasonable certainty that no harm will result” from their 
86 See supra Part I.C.1 (noting that few persons pay more than a token 
share of the stated retail price of prescription drugs they consume). 
87 The category of prescription drugs was formally codified later in the 
Durphy-Humphrey Amendment to the FDCA. Act of Oct. 25, 1951, 65 Stat. 
648 (1951) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2004)). 
88 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 503, 52 Stat. 1051, codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 353 (2004). 
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consumption.89 Applied to prescription drugs, such a definition 
of safety would shipwreck the industry. 
All prescription drugs are dangerous, then. The only way to 
regard them as “safe” is to take into account the good they do: 
their efficacy and effectiveness.90 Seen this way, ineffective 
drugs are (once again) not an inert gun that didn’t fire, but a 
source of statistically certain danger to patients without an offset 
of purposefully obtained therapeutic gain. 
D.  Emotional Distress 
Just as commentary about the effect of liability on 
prescription drugs has been one-sided, focusing on 
overdeterrence to the exclusion of other policy consequences, 
the jurisprudence of the effectiveness criterion as a source of 
emotional distress has lamented only the dolor of drugs withheld 
from the market. In the literature on the effectiveness criterion, 
for example, AIDS activists are found sharing their grief and 
rage over lack of access to therapies.91 A father mourns his dead 
son, to whom the FDA said it would give a particular 
unapproved drug only after conventional treatment failed—too 
late.92
Lack of efficacy and lack of effectiveness also cause 
emotional distress. Patients who take a drug that turns out, 
without warning, to lack efficacy have reason to lament lost 
opportunities. To some degree they share this unhappiness with 
medical providers and third-party payors. Whatever underlying 
pathologies called for clinical intervention have not gone away, 
and whatever hopeful comfort patients took from the prescribing 
of new drugs must end when they learn the truth about futility. 
89 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(i) (2004). 
90 Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1996). 
91 See Jay Branegan, An Uproar Over AIDS Drugs, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987; 
Holston, supra note 45 (recalling the “wrenching experience” of working 
inside the FDA in the 1980s when activists, in a “furious outburst,” 
demanded “immediate access to unapproved therapies”). 
92 See supra note 47. 
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Because of this blow to their optimism, they are now worse off 
than they were back when they had only the pathological 
condition and no prescription-drug treatment history for it. Some 
patients have the temperament or circumstance (stoicism, 
religious faith, perversity) to ease this blow: but it appears 
reasonable to associate distress with disappointment on matters 
of one’s health. We have noted that effectiveness, the fulfillment 
of promises made on a drug’s label, sets up a contract-like 
relation between buyer (patient, physician, or third-party payor) 
and seller. Contract doctrine generally withholds redress for 
emotional distress, but recognizes that breached contracts can in 
fact cause this injury, and permits recovery when “the breach is 
of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a likely 
result.”93
Distress derived from inefficacy and ineffectiveness is 
manifest in case law, if one is willing to look for it. Although 
plaintiffs can seldom recover when unsafe drugs cause them 
emotional distress without objective symptoms of physical harm, 
the cases show that many patients attribute fear, anxiety, grief, 
and intense unhappiness to encounters they had with prescription 
drugs and their close analogue, prescription medical devices.94 
These emotions turn up in judicial opinions even though the 
safety-focused personal injury doctrine emphatically does not 
want to hear about them. Drug-effectiveness law wants to hear 
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981). 
94 For unsuccessful claims, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E. 2d 171 
(Mass. 1982) (denying recovery to DES-exposed plaintiffs who had not yet 
developed adenosis or adenocarcinoma); Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal. 
App. 4th 454 (2003) (denying recovery to a strict vegan who became 
distraught when he learned that, contrary to assurances, the tuberculosis test 
he had taken contained animal products). A rare success story for plaintiffs 
was litigation over a defective heart valve, recalled in 1985 because of its 
propensity to fracture. In 1993 the manufacturer, Shiley, paid confidential 
settlements to 260 plaintiffs for their emotional distress. See DAVID G. 
OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY, & MARY K. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
AND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 682-83 (4th ed. 2004) (also citing 
Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993), which 
allowed an emotional-distress claim over a different heart valve that made 
loud noise, audible at 30 feet). 
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them even less. A reversal of this stance would bring to case 
law extended accounts of regret, frustration, resentment, 
pessimism about the possibility of relief, and anxiety about lost 
opportunities that were always present, but suppressed under 
doctrine that refused to recognize them. 
III.  A PARTIAL CURE IN THE COURTS 
What can courts do, in the context of personal injury 
litigation, to enforce a consumer entitlement to effectiveness as 
well as safety?95 The suggestions offered here rest on Part I’s 
understanding of effectiveness and the consumers who hold 
expectations about it. Like other discussions of drug 
effectiveness, they include references to efficacy and 
comparative effectiveness, yet also maintain the Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act’s implicit definition of effectiveness as living up to 
promises on a label.96
At present, deceptive-practices statutes and common law 
fraud provide redress for those instances of ineffectiveness that 
reach the level of deceit, but do not explicitly connect 
ineffectiveness with physical injury. Subparts A and B below 
suggest ways for courts to recognize this connection. The 
implicit conception of standing used there (and also in Subpart C 
infra, which advocates robust punitive damages), envisions 
plaintiffs who already have good claims of failure to warn, or 
perhaps for design defect, against drug manufacturers: that is to 
say, they have suffered physical injuries suggesting that drugs 
lack safety. Claims of lack of effectiveness as well as of the 
more familiar safety claims become available in such actions, 
95 The focus on state law in this article, see supra note 37, does not 
neglect federal judges. Pursuant to diversity jurisdiction they hear drug injury 
cases, see supra note 10 (noting two FDA preemption cases in federal court 
interpreting Pennsylvania and New York Law), and for non-diversity cases, 
federal common law may be available, Erie notwithstanding. See Geiger & 
Rosen, supra note 24, at 422-27 (observing that federal common law “still 
flourishes” to implement federal statutes, and that the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act is well suited to this type of common law). 
96 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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and thus amenable to adjudication, when judges accept any of 
the following shifts in doctrine. 
A.  Mandate Information about the Comparative Record, 
Using Failure to Warn Doctrine 
Because personal-injury liability for injuries caused by 
prescription drugs centers around failure to warn, anyone who 
seeks to change the outcomes of drug-liability litigation will 
begin with the law of warning. Products liability law relies on 
warning as a means to make users’ encounters with products less 
dangerous. A manufacturer must use reasonable care in the 
design and fabrication of its products and then, to the extent 
foreseeable dangers remain, warn users. In principle, warnings, 
which can convey advice on how to use a product safely and 
whether to reject it altogether,97 keep to a minimum the effects 
of dangers that cannot be eliminated through improved design.98
Applied to cases where defendants sold their product with a 
warning—all personal-injury claims for drug-caused harms fall 
in this category, because FDA regulations look closely at 
packaging and compel sellers to submit proposed words for pre-
clearance before marketing—doctrine focuses on its “adequacy” 
or “sufficiency.” The leading case on adequate warning, 
Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.,99 identifies an 
obligation of the seller to communicate to the consumer what he 
or she would reasonably want to know about risks. That for 
most prescription drugs manufacturers discharge their duty by 
warning a “learned intermediary” between them and the 
97 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in 
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
265, 285 (1991) (distinguishing between “risk reduction” and “informed 
choice” warnings). 
98 For a trenchant reminder to courts that, notwithstanding § 402A of the 
Second Restatement, warnings should insulate manufacturers from liability 
only when the dangers could not have been eliminated by reasonable 
redesign, see Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive 
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994). 
99 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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patient—that is, the patient’s physician—does not alter the need 
for adequacy. 
The current Restatement states the duty to warn concisely: 
“A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe 
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable 
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are 
not provided” to “prescribing and other health-care providers” 
or patients directly, depending on the context.100 Because safety 
is a context-driven condition, bound up with effectiveness—even 
a small risk is too much when the drug is absolutely 
ineffective—and because no prescription drug is perfectly safe, 
this black-letter necessarily takes effectiveness into account. And 
whenever consumers have more than one treatment to choose 
from, effectiveness cannot be divorced from comparisons with 
the drug’s alternatives. 
To put the point within traditional warning doctrine, a 
crucial element of an adequate warning is communication about 
the consequences of not heeding it. Warnings are messages 
about choice. The risk reduction category of warning says, 
“When you use our product, consider the following concurrent 
precaution, for the following reason.” Warnings in the other 
category, informed choice, give users what they need to know as 
they decide between abstention and engagement. Although an 
implicit comparator is present also in the risk reduction 
category, informed choice is the central reason to tell consumers 
about alternatives. 
The FDA, acting perhaps out of its mistaken belief that drug 
regulators considering a new drug application have no authority 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to consider what 
comparators offer,101 has not ordered manufacturers to provide 
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) 
(1998). 
101 Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard 
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 
437 (2002) (noting FDA resistance to regulating drug comparisons). See also 
Mehlman, supra note 36, at 788 (observing that the FDA almost never 
withholds approval on the ground that a drug is inferior to “an alternative 
already on the market”). 
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this comparative information to consumers.102 The lost 
opportunity has led to a comprehensive and fundamental 
deprivation, so complete that reformers have had trouble 
imagining repair. In a moment of what he called “wishful 
thinking,”103 physician-pharmacologist Jerry Avorn wrote two 
sentences that manufacturers could tack onto the label of most 
newly approved drugs, if they were inclined to tell the whole 
truth: “This new medication has not been shown to be any better 
than currently available products, and has a much more limited 
safety record. There is no evidence that its higher price is 
accompanied by any demonstrated therapeutic advantage.”104
While regulatory politics in Washington prevent the FDA 
from demanding that much candor about the effectiveness of a 
drug before approval, judges who interpret and apply the 
common law duty to warn remain free to determine that silence 
about alternatives withholds from consumers information to 
which they are entitled. The law of preemption does not block 
this stance: most courts agree that the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act does not preempt claims against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for warning defects in prescription drugs, and 
maintain that “drug labeling regulations generally impose only 
minimum standards—these regulatory provisions provide merely 
a safety floor—and state tort law beneficially supplements 
federal regulatory efforts to promote drug safety.”105 Although 
the FDA announced in 2006 by preamble its view that agency 
approval of labeling preempts failure-to-warn claims,106 this 
view is not entitled to deference from judges.107 States may, if 
102 Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 18. 
103 JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES 365 (2004). 
104 Id. 
105 Owen, supra note 8, at 909. 
106 Food and Drug Administration, Requirements on Content and Format 
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 3922, 2924 (2006). 
107 See Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006) (so holding with respect to a suit in which the FDA had filed an 
amicus brief). See also Timothy Ardizzone, Comment, The FDA: Advocate 
or Regulator of the Pharmaceutical Industry? The Attempted Preemption by 
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they wish, enact statutes that impose a contrary pro-preemption 
stance.108 The majority of them do not constrict their common 
law by this means. Courts construing the law of most states thus 
may deem a warning inadequate even if the FDA approved it. 
Congress and state legislatures, in sum, have given federal and 
state judges latitude to set warning standards high enough to 
include the comparative information that the FDA did not 
demand. 
Regarding the content of this missing information about 
comparative treatments, the phrase “informed choice” continues 
instructive. Different consumers have differing needs to be 
informed about the relative merits of each drug. Recall the three 
categories of consumers: physicians, patients, third-party payors. 
Prescribing physicians cannot make informed treatment decisions 
without manufacturer-furnished information of how drugs 
compare to their patented competitors, to generics and other 
non-patented treatments, and to no treatment at all. Patients 
might for some drugs be entitled to information not mediated 
through their physicians, even though, as was mentioned, the 
learned intermediary doctrine is undisturbed by a judicial stance 
that manufacturers must provide information about comparative 
effectiveness; judges need not jettison this traditional protector 
of defense interests when they rule that the failure to provide 
comparative information can result in a warning defect. Indeed, 
the learned intermediary doctrine is worth remembering here: 
courts decided that warning physicians rather than the patient 
suffices to discharge the duty to warn not because patients are 
too stupid to follow directions but in recognition of the vast 
array of choices and tradeoffs that drugs present—an array that 
has become much more vast since courts formed the doctrine 
the FDA of State Tort Claims for Failure to Warn on Pharmaceutical 
Labeling, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 780-86 (2006) (arguing that the FDA’s 
effort violates an executive order, reflects unsound policymaking, and is 
entitled to no Chevron deference because it is in effect an advisory opinion). 
108 See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 600.2946 (5) (Michie 2007) (enacted 
1995) (providing that, absent fraud or bribery, FDA approval preempts 
common law warning and design claims). 
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decades ago.109
It also bears mention that under the law of informed consent, 
a physician must “inform the patient of a drug’s benefits and 
dangers (as well as the benefits and dangers of no treatment and 
alternative treatments).”110 If such information about how a drug 
performs is integral to the practice of medicine, then it is 
equally integral to the proper marketing of this type of product. 
Indeed, the medical-malpractice concept of informed consent 
relates closely to the products-liability concept of informed 
choice. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability co-
reporter Aaron D. Twerski has argued in work co-authored with 
Neil B. Cohen that physicians should be obliged to tell their 
patients not only about alternative treatments but alternative 
providers. 111 In other words, when the physician or a managed-
care defendant knows that other physicians have a better track 
record in performing the service in question, failure to so inform 
the patient is a violation of the duty to obtain informed consent. 
This contention, though still unfamiliar, has support in case 
law.112
By denying that patients need to receive direct warnings 
about most types of drugs, the learned intermediary doctrine 
opens several realistic avenues to encourage the furnishing of 
comparative information. The Avorn warning on a patient insert 
becomes less necessary when “learned intermediaries” possess 
basic data about the drug in its market. Just as physicians are 
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b 
(1998); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W. 3d 758, 763-64 (Ky. 2004) 
(summarizing rationales for the doctrine). 
110 Owen, supra note 8, at 608-09. 
111 Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in 
Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 24 (1999); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical 
Providers: A First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. 
REV. 5, 13 (1992). 
112 Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W. 2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (holding, in an 
informed consent case, that comparative mortality and morbidity data about 
the surgeon-defendant were properly admitted at trial); DeGennaro v. 
Tandon, 873 A.2d 191 (Conn. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant had an 
obligation to disclose her relative lack of experience). 
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presumed to be learned about the patient’s needs, so too might 
third-party payors be deemed the correct recipients of 
information about comparative effectiveness. 
B.  Fine-Tune § 6(c) of the Third Restatement 
In their Section 6(c), about design-defect liability for 
prescription drugs, the reporters of Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability wrote provocative new blackletter that did not 
pretend to restate what courts were doing, except in its bottom 
line on which side ought to prevail.113 Judges have always been 
hostile to claims that prescription drugs are defective in design, 
and the Restatement continues this posture of rejection. The 
novelty of the “unusual, to say the least”114 rule in § 6(c) is its 
unique rejectionist path: a drug is defective in design only if a 
reasonably informed health-care provider, “knowing of its 
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe . . . [it to] any class of patients.”115 Traditionally 
courts would reach the same answer with reference to the much-
maligned comment k of the Second Restatement, which had 
deemed prescription drugs “unavoidably unsafe” and hence not 
defective as a matter of law. 
The test for defectiveness that the Third Restatement, 
comment k, and the judicial consensus all reject for prescription 
drugs is the one that governs design-defect claims about products 
that are not prescription drugs: risk-utility balancing (at a macro 
level) or the possibility that a plaintiff can prevail by presenting 
a better alternative design. Neither of these analytic devices is 
available to plaintiffs in drug-design cases: a plaintiff cannot 
113 While the Restatement was in draft form, one commentator observed 
that “no published decision proffers the ‘reasonable physician’ or ‘reasonable 
health care provider’ as a legal test for determining whether or not the drug 
or prescription device in question is unavoidably unsafe.” Jeffrey D. 
Winchester, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It 
Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 670-71 (1997). 
114 Owen, supra note 8, at 556. 
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) 
(1998). 
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prevail by showing that a drug as designed does more harm than 
good in the aggregate. Nor can claimants bring to court 
proposed chemical reformulations that engineer out the dangers 
they have identified. “Drug designs are different,” intoned the 
reporters.116 Indeed. Because physicians oversee distribution, 
this product—unlike most other products, which a user can buy 
and consume without pre-clearance—can go to individuals who 
can benefit from it and kept from those who would be hurt by 
its danger. Only when no benefited cohort exists is the design 
bad; almost every drug that injures a plaintiff could help heal 
another person, and so the failure lies not in design but in 
distribution. 
So far, so good: yet a departure from risk-utility assessment 
this radical still favors pharmaceutical defendants in contrast to 
all other manufacturing defendants, and the fact that 
pharmaceutical defendants had to climb regulatory hurdles may 
not be enough reason to protect them this much. Courts enjoy a 
chance to modify the radicalism of § 6(c) by paying heed to the 
Traynorian heritage. Although the central “drugs are different” 
contention remains sound, when not construed carefully § 6(c) 
achieves little beyond protection for the industry via a slammed 
courthouse door. 
A few suggestions pertinent to a Restatement § 6(c)-based 
motion for summary judgment in response to a design-defect 
claim: 
(1) Compel the manufacturer, rather than the plaintiff, to 
identify the § 6(c) “class of patients” in order to prevail on 
summary judgment. The “class of patients” criterion of § 6(c) 
overtly states, in blackletter, the relevance of effectiveness to 
personal-injury litigation. Because effectiveness is so central to § 
6(c), courts that accept this rule of this section can justifiably 
use the burden of production to help achieve it. In commentary, 
the Restatement implies that the plaintiff holds the obligation to 
persuade on the “no class of patients” point,117 but it is wrong 
116 See supra note 33. 
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998) 
cmt. f (“Given this very demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be 
imposed only under unusual circumstances. The court has the responsibility 
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to saddle a plaintiff with this burden after she has identified a 
flaw in the design of the drug, proposed the rudiments of a 
feasible alternative, and shown that the design caused her injury. 
Manufacturers instead should have to identify the class of 
patients that would benefit from its challenged design. 
Notwithstanding dicta in one case that rejected § 6(c) for its 
state (on the ground that it is “too strict”118), a mere assertion 
by “the defense’s expert witness that the drug at issue had some 
benefit for any single class of people”119 should not suffice for 
summary judgment. Expert testimony on the point should be 
open to Daubert scrutiny.120
The reasons to put this burden on defendants rather than on 
plaintiffs are comprehensive. Defendants will typically know 
who would benefit from their drugs as designed, whereas 
plaintiffs would have to go to expense and trouble to support 
their contention that no such class of patients exists. The 
defendant’s task of identifying one benefited class is much easier 
than the plaintiff’s task of showing that no such class exists. 
Imposing this cost on defendants would lower the cost of 
bringing valuable information to public light. 
Second, consistent with other burden-shifting doctrines in 
tort law, this category of plaintiff has demonstrated her 
exceptional status among plaintiffs. She can benefit from the 
burden-shifting rule only after demonstrating that the product in 
question either fails in a macro-balance inquiry or should be 
replaced by a feasible alternative design.121  
Perhaps the most salubrious effect of this rule is its 
to determine when the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence so that 
reasonable persons could conclude that plaintiff has met this demanding 
standard.”). 
118 Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W. 2d 827, 840 (Neb. 
2000). 
119 Id. 
120 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
121 Cf. Susan Epstein, Tort Reform to Ensure the Inclusion of Fertile 
Women in Early Phases of Commercial Drug Research, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 355 (1996) (defending a burden-shifting proposal to favor 
plaintiffs in litigation against drug manufacturers with reference to criteria 
courts have used to support this shift). 
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propensity to generate (not just reveal) more information. 
Scholars have shown that current law encourages a manufacturer 
of risky or toxic products to stick its corporate head in the sand, 
choosing lack of knowledge over knowledge in order to benefit 
from a lower standard of care.122 With the “class of patients” 
burden put on defendants, however, the manufacturer prospers 
by doing the post-marketing studies that the FDA does not now 
demand.123 Even if the number of plaintiffs bringing design 
defect claims remains relatively low notwithstanding this easing 
of their obligations, manufacturers would, out of prudence, be 
prepared to describe the class of patients to whom a reasonable 
provider would prescribe their products. The preparation of such 
information offers social utility at a relatively cheap price. 
(2) Demand information about the § 6(c) “class of patients” 
beyond the fact that such a class exists. Consumers would 
benefit from more information about which groups of patients 
benefit from a particular drug. The cohorts that pharmaceutical 
interventions address are not generally known. Which groups 
have relevant traits in common? Why are they well positioned to 
benefit from a particular drug? How did researchers learn about 
the effects on this group? Who isn’t benefiting? Litigation offers 
unique opportunities to enhance transparency about marketing 
practices. At present, manufacturers are prohibited from 
suggesting in their advertisements that physicians make 
therapeutic use of a drug for a purpose that the FDA has not 
approved, but if they stop short of overt advertisement, in 
practice they enjoy latitude to promote these unapproved 
122 Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic 
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997). See also Margaret A. Berger, 
Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and 
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2138-39 (1997) (noting that even if a 
manufacturer can expect to be found liable for harm its toxic product caused, 
the costs of this liability are remote and contingent, whereas the cost of 
researching present dangers arrives immediately). 
123 Wagner, supra note 122, at 833-48. While this Article was going to 
press, the United States Senate passed a bill expanding FDA oversight over 
drugs post-approval. Commentators expressed confidence that the measure 
would become law. Heading Toward Reform of the FDA, N.Y. TIMES, May 
11, 2007, at A26 (noting overwhelming 93-1 “veto-proof majority” vote). 
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applications. 
Much discreet, unreviewable promoting takes place behind 
closed doors in medical offices. In one familiar scenario, an 
attractive young saleswoman working on commission, successor 
to the “detail man” of yore, totes sample pills and corporate-
embossed trinkets (and often an expense account to pay for 
meals) when she visits a physician to suggest expanded patient 
demographics for her brand-name product.124 Some observers 
who do not receive these freebies have wanted to know more 
about the promotional script, but their suggestions that the FDA 
(or another regulator like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission) monitor more closely what drug companies spend 
on promotions and what usages their agents recommend have not 
been heeded. Trial judges, who lack authority to produce the 
information-fostering rules that regulators have declined to 
write, can nevertheless encourage the production of information 
by reading § 6(c) as an expansive rather than a narrow standard. 
They can withhold summary judgment and send drug-design 
claims to the jury when a manufacturer does not furnish full 
information about the class of patients that benefit from the 
challenged design. 
(3) For § 6(c) purposes, courts should welcome evidence of 
“off-label” practices. Continuing the expansiveness theme, “off-
label” uses should be available to litigants and courts that seek 
124 One physician has confessed that he enjoys the company of “pharma 
babes” in his office: 
On the record, most docs will say reps are just a minor 
distraction, that as professionals “we do our learning the old-
fashioned way.” The cheap pens and pads adorned with logos 
and drug names and the occasional steak dinners are supposed to 
mean nothing to us. But 10 minutes of rapt attention from a 
smiling beauty is still 10 minutes more than usual. So what if 
she’s talking about nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea–we talk about 
that stuff too. . . . I eavesdropped on the medical marketing 
world when I repped medical devices for a summer job in 
college—the reps knew what suckers doctors were and taught me 
to take advantage of the fact. It hasn’t changed; just grab hold of 
that inflated medical ego and twist—over we go. 
Scott Haig, Attack of the Pharma Babes, TIME, Jan. 2, 2007. 
BERNSTEIN.DOC 7/1/2007 10:42 PM 
 ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS 1093 
                                                          
the class of patients to which a reasonably informed provider 
would give the drug as designed. “Off-label,” a bit of industry 
jargon, refers to uses and indications that are not named in the 
labeling and packaging that the FDA approves when it permits a 
manufacturer to market a prescription drug. Physicians who 
prescribe a pharmaceutical product to treat a condition are not 
bound by the indications for which the FDA approved the drug, 
and can dispense it to any patient.125
One category of drug now used much more often off-label 
than on- is tricyclic antidepressants, mentioned above, one of the 
earliest FDA-approved treatments for depression. Providers now 
seldom dispense them for this purpose. The tricyclic design 
might now be defective in terms of its officially sanctioned 
purpose, then, because it is unsafe and ineffective when viewed 
in relation to alternatives for its approved use. Yet a reasonably 
informed provider would consider prescribing tricyclic 
antidepressants for several classes of patients—persons suffering 
from bulimia, cystitis, irritable bowel syndrome, even persistent 
hiccups126—and so a plaintiff bringing a design-defect claim 
ought to lose with reference to these off-label uses. 
More clarity in the law of evidence could bolster the off-
label concept and make it cheaper to administer in court. For 
example, courts could recognize expertise in off-label 
dispensation as distinct from whether a reasonable physician 
would dispense a drug off-label to a particular patient and 
accordingly allow non-physician witnesses to testify, or perhaps 
be allowed to admit what is now characterized as hearsay, 
thereby lowering expert-witness costs for litigants. Live 
testimony might be required only in unusual circumstances. Like 
the other suggestions just made, this recognition of off-label 
prescribing furthers the goal of fostering information by 
encouraging candor and transparency about what prescribers are 
125 The exceptions among prescription drugs are “controlled substances” 
like opiates, whose distribution the Drug Enforcement Agency monitors 
closely, with an eye toward reducing the dangers of addiction. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801 et seq. (2004). 
126  MARTINDALE: THE COMPLETE DRUG REFERENCE (33d ed.) (Sean 
Sweetman ed., 2002). 
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doing with this product. 
For good or ill—probably, on the whole, for good—off-label 
uses of prescription drugs have begotten a trove of new 
therapies.127 Cancer patients today are seldom restricted to the 
four corners of FDA-approved uses for a drug, especially when 
their physicians believe they are running out of time.128 One 
famous prescription drug, Viagra, would not have been 
developed and patented as a treatment for erectile dysfunction if 
its manufacturer had not noted the side effect that subjects 
reported when they used an angina drug under study;129 the 
cardiac use for which Pfizer intended to seek on-label approval 
never reached the market. American patients have been enlisted 
in a massive uncontrolled experiment in off-label dispensation 
that has helped and hurt them to an extent regulators do not 
measure. Evidence-law reform could encourage the publication 
of more off-label experience—both good and bad—and bring to 
light data that the industry possesses and now shares only 
selectively. 
C.  Punitive Damages and Effectiveness 
In the hymnal that is the consensus about personal-injury law 
as over-deterring drug manufacturers from bringing products to 
the market, the song about the evil of punitive damages is 
particularly oft-sung. Many statutes, both proposed and enacted, 
that strive to improve either punitive damages law or 
pharmaceutical law or both eliminate this form of damages in 
actions for injury attributed to an FDA-approved drug.130 The 
leading piece of decisional law on the poor fit between punitive 
127 See Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 41. 
128 Bernadette Tansey, Why Doctors Prescribe Off Label, S.F. CHRON., 
May 1, 2005, at A12. 
129 Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 41. 
130 See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare 
(HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (introduced 2003) at 7; Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. 12-701 (2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2307.80 (C)(1) (2005). 
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987); Oregon, Or. Rev. 
Stat. 30.927 (2000); Utah Code Ann. 78-18-2 (Michie 2004). 
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damages and products liability arose from litigation about a 
cholesterol-lowering drug.131
As with drug litigation generally, critics of liability cannot 
point to defeats in court as a reason for reform—only their lack 
of a guarantee that such defeats could never happen. One 
leading critic, Kip Viscusi, who concedes that courts almost 
never award punitive damages in personal-injury drug litigation 
unless a manufacturer has in effect lied to the FDA—
withholding or rewriting material negative information about its 
product132—nevertheless insists that the industry should receive 
more shelter from “litigation uncertainty” in the form of 
stringent punitive-damages reform.133 Unless the industry badly 
needs more protection from the dreaded forces of overdeterrence 
(a need it has never demonstrated),134 the opposite conclusion 
seems more warranted by the record, with its absence of actual 
awards for anything other than fraud on the regulatory 
authorities. 
Adding effectiveness to the punitive damages matrix could 
raise the number of cases that impose punitive damages on drug 
manufacturers while remaining sensitive to the concern about 
over-deterring product development. As practiced, punitive 
damages for this category of litigation identify the American 
public rather than individual litigants as the victims of 
wrongdoing.135 The plaintiff’s role as private attorney general, 
doing the work of regulators, emerges more clearly than in 
131 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 
1967) (Friendly, J.). 
132 Viscusi, supra note 24, at 1476 n.41. 
133 Id. at 1476-77. 
134 JUDITH P. SWAZEY, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, 
in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND 
INNOVATION 295-96 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) 
(observing that drug manufacturers have the data to demonstrate the adverse 
effects of liability but have never used these facts to document the reform 
proposals they advocate). 
135 Here I am influenced by, but do not hew to, Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 389 (2003) 
(contemplating payouts to recipients who were not parties to originally filed 
claims). 
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personal injury litigation not involving regulated industries, 
where the particulars of the plaintiff create a basis for 
punishment. In drug litigation, by contrast, the plaintiff has 
helped the government do its safety work. Punitive damages for 
this type of injury serve to reward plaintiffs for detecting and 
then deterring misinformation about dangers that thwarted the 
FDA safety mission. Similarly, then, plaintiffs could be 
rewarded for detecting and deterring misinformation that 
thwarted the FDA effectiveness mission.  
The suggestion here is that a subset of plaintiffs with good 
claims for drug-caused injury be allowed to collect punitive 
damages for the societal wrong of selling a prescription drug 
that is not effective, just as a subset now can collect such 
damages for the societal wrong of selling an unsafe prescription 
drug. Criteria for punitive damages would include an injury to 
the plaintiff caused by the drug, a showing that the drug was not 
effective and, again to retain a connection to current punitive-
damages traditions, proof that in its FDA new drug application 
the manufacturer withheld or misstated information about this 
lack of effectiveness. Other restrictive criteria might be added, if 
these prove too generous to plaintiffs. 
This approach to punitive damages requires a court to agree 
that consumers are injured by ineffectiveness; it must reject 
metaphors of unbarking dogs and non-firing guns.136 Once 
courts recognize the reality of injury, they become freer to 
award punitive damages in the right measure. This opportunity 
grows particularly valuable in this post-State Farm era, now that 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that punitive 
damages in an amount too many times larger than the 
compensatory award may violate a defendant’s due process 
rights.137 The baseline of safety-related harm is the value of 
physical injury that the plaintiff suffered, and courts in the 
future might well hold that a plaintiff bringing a safety-related 
claim may not collect more than a single-digit multiple of that 
136 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
137 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-45 
(2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 441-
42 (2001); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) 
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sum. Because ineffectiveness-related harm is less determinate—
and affects third-party payors and physicians, not just patients—
the maximum award for punitive damages can enlarge. 138
Steps toward expanding punitive damages should not be 
taken lightly: courts need to keep overdeterrence in mind. If 
drug manufacturers are now unduly threatened and hampered by 
liability, then more punitive damages for drug claims becomes a 
problem rather than a solution. Yet to a judge seeking to apply 
the law, principles of legislative supremacy are at least as 
worthy of attention as a lament about too much liability. At the 
state level, legislatures that have not banned punitive damages in 
drug cases have manifested a tacit choice to permit them.139 The 
large majority of states that have not adopted a regulatory 
compliance defense have declared that FDA approval of a drug 
is a floor, or minimum, rather than an upper limit on liability. 
At the national level, Congress saw fit (in a unanimous vote) to 
prohibit the sale of any drug for which there is no substantial 
evidence of effectiveness, and has not amended the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act to discourage personal injury litigation with 
express preemption, a regulatory compliance defense, or a ban 
on punitive damages—all choices that it had the authority to 
make. It is reasonable to infer that legislatures support the 
expansion of punitive damages for deceiving the FDA on 
effectiveness. 
As for the policy effects of punitive damages, judges should 
138 When this Article went to press, published case law in the wake of 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) had just barely 
begun to appear. In Williams, a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed a 
judgment of $79 million in punitive damages on the ground that this sum had 
reflected recognition of injuries to persons who were not parties to the action. 
Much rides on whether Williams stands for the proposition that very large 
punitive damage awards violate the Due Process Clause simply by their size 
and indeterminancy. Should its reach prove more modest in operation, then 
the understanding of ineffectiveness as a distinct source of personal injury 
becomes vital for the force of this measure following its constitutionalization 
post-1996. 
139 See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 175-76 (pointing out, by 
naming only a few states, that the majority of United States legislatures do 
not single out drug cases as less deserving of punitive damages). 
BERNSTEIN.DOC 7/1/2007 10:42 PM 
1098 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
bear in mind the distinction between effectiveness and efficacy. 
Mere failure to attain clinical improvement in patients does not 
violate the post-1962 mandate that a drug must be effective. The 
job of a drug is to live up to the promises on its label. Telling 
the truth about what the drug will do, then, would insulate a 
manufacturer from punitive damages. 
“No it won’t,” a spokesperson for the industry might retort. 
“One runaway jury misreading a label, and our multimillion-
dollar investment in development is done for.” Anti-liability 
partisans might envision a badly injured sympathetic plaintiff—
perhaps a child injured in utero—serving as the compensatory 
base, with punitive damages fancifully extracted by misreading 
of a label. 
Such worries lack foundation. Heart-tugging plaintiffs have 
enjoyed whatever powers they have held for years; they are 
unaddressed in this Article. The power identified by expanded 
liability comes from authoritative yet dishonest words. A 
plaintiff’s lawyer could win punitive damages only by showing 
that promises about clinical effects were false by design. This 
verbal, text-based contention is rooted in contract, and breach of 
a written contract is inherently cooler, less manipulative, and 
less inflammatory than a claim of personal injury attributed to 
wrongful action. 
CONCLUSION 
After many years of criticism about its over-deterrent effects, 
prescription drug liability has become stagnant. Legislation, case 
law, and scholarship, all sharing their worry about reducing the 
supply of prescription drugs, dampened the fiery old conviction 
that products liability enhances consumer welfare. In a literature 
now deficient in balance, writers propose few suggestions for 
reform beyond liability-squelching.  
The result is a sorry circle. Daunted by anti-liability rhetoric 
that is among other things an attack on their work product, 
judges feel they can achieve less through the imposition of 
liability. When courts do less with liability, liability comes to 
have fewer effects. When liability has fewer effects, it does less 
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observable good, and becomes both harder to embrace and 
easier to decry for its hypothetical power to wreck an industry. 
The circle is complete when these attacks daunt the judiciary. 
No surprise, then, that personal-injury liability for defective 
drugs has achieved little to improve welfare since the heady days 
when it blasted the Dalkon Shield out of the market and sent a 
strong consumer-protection message. 
This outcome would be acceptable, even desirable, if liability 
really hurts rather than helps the public. Prescription-drug 
liability probably offers both overdeterrence and under-
deterrence, however. Although the persons who manage 
manufacturers undoubtedly feel apprehensive about the 
possibility of paying ruinous damages to litigious victims,140 and 
the industry has suffered unjustly on occasion in court,141 the 
pharmaceutical sector has also been prospering at the expense of 
consumers. Numerous commentators have decried them for 
producing and selling unsafe drugs. Less well-documented in the 
courts and in law reviews, but at the center of this Article, is the 
fact that this industry also produces and profits from ineffective 
and inefficacious drugs. 
Lack of safety and lack of effectiveness both violate a 
popular, uncontroversial, established-for-decades statutory 
mandate. Regarding safety claims, participants in and observers 
of the drug-liability system accept that the Food and Drug 
140 See supra note 21. 
141 Bendectin is widely believed to be a martyr drug. See generally 
GREEN, supra note 3 (describing Bendectin as a poster child of courts driving 
away a valuable drug). One critic of liability argues that two intrauterine 
devices, the Copper-7 and Lippes Loop, were also martyred following the 
well-deserved demise of the Dalkon Shield. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: 
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 41-42 (1988). In response 
to Huber in particular, defenders of liability have retorted that when the 
disappearance of a particular drug results from poor marketing, disappointing 
profits, or perhaps even a desire to flounce away from the market to express 
pique about the existence of liability, its manufacturer will naturally prefer to 
blame what it could not control. Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi’s Revenge? Junk 
Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 283, 297 (1992) 
(reviewing Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge); Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort 
Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 685-89 (1990) (reviewing Huber’s Liability). 
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Administration will not detect every safety-related flaw in 
advance of approval, and they agree that litigation ex post 
functions as a means to remedy this deficiency (some like this 
litigation; some don’t). The same reasoning suggests that 
litigation ex post is also a means (some will like this litigation; 
some won’t) to remedy the deficiency in effectiveness. 
True, the harm of an ineffective drug is harder to see than 
the harm of an unsafe one, and when harm is not seen, personal-
injury litigation appears beside the point. It is not. Safety and 
effectiveness are related conditions that cannot be understood in 
isolation from each other. Lack of effectiveness is central to lack 
of safety. Without the possibility of good results, even small 
risks are unjustified. Without alignment between label-promises 
and outcomes, the perils of deceit, wrongfully gained revenue, 
and emotional distress loom large. Without therapeutic benefit 
from a product (putting aside for this purpose the small 
percentage of prescription drugs that give consumers things they 
do not need to sustain their life or health, such as sexual 
enhancements or new hair growth), a patient remains in danger. 
Lack of effectiveness in a drug causes plenty of harm. A subset 
of injured persons ought to find relief in the courts for this 
injury. 
In conclusion, recall overdeterrence—both its reality and its 
specter. So long as legislators and commentators continue to site 
the problem of supply incentives at the heart of prescription-
drug liability, judges cannot, and should not, abandon their 
present concern about over-wielding the liability sanction. 
Accordingly, the specific suggestions to them offered in this 
Article take only modest first steps.142 In the event of a future 
revised consensus that what vexes the prescription drug market 
is too little deterrence rather than too much—the belief that 
launched strict products liability around the time that the 1962 
drug amendments were enacted—stronger reforms than those 
proposed here could be written: for example, courts could 
bolster the qui tam action to augment rewards for bringing 
142 See supra n.28 and Part III. 
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ineffectiveness to public light,143 and courts and legislatures 
could encourage class actions that allege deception by drug 
manufacturers.144 Meanwhile, policy-minded judges mindful of 
the importance of supply must also bear in mind that each drug 
on the American market wrapped in false promises of 
therapeutic gain violates a law-based entitlement to 
effectiveness.145 This wrong ought to imply a right. 
 
143 For example, federal courts could bolster the qui tam action by 
allowing a person who knows that an FDA-approved drug is not effective to 
invoke the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2005). This statute allows 
for treble damages and provides that the initiator, called the realtor, collects 
between 15 and 30 percent of any recovery if the action succeeds. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d)(1) (2005). Qui tam helped bring down overpromotion and other 
misconduct related to the epilepsy drug Neurontin. See supra note 15; Ralph 
F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks 
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 
61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 662-63 (2006) (noting that the realtor, a 
physician named David Franklin, recovered $27 million for his Neurontin 
work). For a qui tam reform proposal focusing on drug safety, see Catherine 
T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 587 (2005). State courts, for their part, could become more 
welcoming to deceptive-trade practices actions. 
144 See supra note 37 (observing that at present, many courts appear to 
favor discouragement). 
145 In addition to imposing an extraordinarily high effectiveness hurdle 
for new-drug approval, the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act took an intolerant view of existing approved drugs. These 
drugs benefited surprisingly little from “grandfathering” or a presumption of 
effectiveness, and in the 1960s the FDA put them through controlled studies 
to see how well they measured up to the claims on their labels. See supra 
note 53; PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (2d ed. 1991). 
